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Abstract
Background: At the onset of an influenza pandemic, when the severity of a novel strain is still undetermined and
there is a threat of introduction into a new environment, e.g., via the deployment of military troops, sensitive
screening criteria and conservative isolation practices are generally recommended.
Objectives: In response to elevated rates of influenza-like illness among U.S. military base camps in Kuwait, U.S.
Naval Medical Research Unit No. 3 partnered with local U.S. Army medical units to conduct an A(H1N1) pdm09
outbreak investigation.
Patients/Methods: Initial clinical data and nasal specimens were collected via the existent passive surveillance
system and active surveillance was conducted using a modified version of the World Health Organization/U.S.
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention influenza-like illness case definition [fever (T > 100.5˚F/38˚C) in addition
to cough and/or sore throat in the previous 72 hours] as the screening criteria. Samples were tested via real-time
reverse-transcription PCR and sequenced for comparison to global A(H1N1) pdm09 viruses from the same time
period.
Results: The screening criteria used in Kuwait proved insensitive, capturing only 16% of A(H1N1) pdm09-positive
individuals. While still not ideal, using cough as the sole screening criteria would have increased sensitivity to 73%.
Conclusions: The results of and lessons learned from this outbreak investigation suggest that pandemic influenza
risk management should be a dynamic process (as information becomes available regarding true attack rates and
associated mortality, screening and isolation criteria should be re-evaluated and revised as appropriate), and that
military operational environments present unique challenges to influenza surveillance.
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Introduction
Respiratory illnesses, including influenza, constitute a
significant disease burden in military settings. Historically,
deployed military troops are at increased risk of respiratory
disease due to high attack rates, rapid onset and difficulty
controlling transmission in austere and crowded environments
[1,2]. As demonstrated in the influenza pandemics of 1918 and
1919, transmission of influenza among service members can
play an important role in transcontinental spread of influenza.
In fact, the first documented influenza outbreak in the spring of
1918, prior to the pandemic, was among recruits at Fort Riley,
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Kansas [3]. As recently as the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, the first
evidence of community transmission of the virus in Spain was
detected during an outbreak investigation of influenza-like
illness (ILI) in soldiers from an engineering military academy
[4].
The United States (U.S.) Department of Defense (DOD)
influenza surveillance program is two-pronged, with one
focusing on DOD active duty members and their beneficiaries
and another focusing on local capacity building to improve
surveillance in strategic areas of the world. The Armed Forces
Health Surveillance Center funds influenza surveillance
programs in multiple locations, including overseas military
bases [5]. Standardized epidemiologic data and a nasal wash
are collected from individuals who meet the World Health
Organization (WHO) ILI case definition. Samples are
transported to the U.S. Air Force School of Aerospace
Medicine laboratories for influenza testing, subtyping,
molecular characterization and analysis [5,6]. The DOD played
an active role in the A(H1N1) pdm09 pandemic, including the
detection of the first case in the U.S. [7]. Following the WHO
declaration of a phase five pandemic alert on 29 April, 2009,
DOD medical entities overseas were on alert for increased
influenza-like activity.
In late April 2009, unusually high rates of ILI were detected
by the existing passive surveillance system among U.S. military
base camps in Kuwait. The ILI cases were concentrated at
Camp Buehring, a U.S. Army base camp in northwest Kuwait
that has served as a staging and training base for tens of
thousands of U.S. troops deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan.
U.S. Naval Medical Research Unit No. 3 (NAMRU-3), a DOD
infectious disease research laboratory in Cairo, Egypt, was
asked to provide influenza diagnostics and conduct an ILI
outbreak investigation at Camp Buehring. This report describes
several aspects of the investigation, including early active
screening efforts and attempts to mitigate spread of ILI within
the camp; , the genetic characteristics of the collected samples;
and the challenges with and lessons learned from outbreak
activities in an operational environment.
Materials and Methods
Recruitment and Enrollment
On 7 May 2009, NAMRU-3 began an outbreak investigation
in collaboration with the Forward Deployed Medical Unit
(FDPMU) assigned to Camp Arifjan, Kuwait. Initial activities
were aimed at providing local diagnostic support for 24
respiratory samples that had already been collected via
passive surveillance. Per routine clinical management, these
samples had been collected via nasal wash from patients who
presented at U.S. military clinics throughout Kuwait, and were
tested using the QuickVue influenza test (Quidel, San Diego,
CA, USA), a rapid influenza antigen test. These samples were
subsequently processed for RNA and analyzed by real-time
reverse transcriptase PCR (rt-RT-PCR) at Camp Arifjan using a
Light Cycler 2.0 thermocycler (Roche, Indianapolis, IN, USA) to
rule out seasonal influenza. As the majority of the initial cases
were identified at the Camp Buehring Troop Medical Clinic
(TMC) following the first week of testing, the thermocycler and
related supplies were relocated to Camp Buehring, where they
remained for the duration of the outbreak. All 24 specimens
from the initial batch were transported to NAMRU-3 for
confirmatory testing via the Applied Biosystems 7500 Fast PCR
system (Applied Biosytems, Foster City, CA, USA).
Additionally, on 19 May, the NAMRU-3 investigation team, in
collaboration with the Camp Buehring medical staff, conducted
an active influenza screening for A(H1N1) pdm09 among two
U.S. Army units that had recently arrived at Camp Buehring.
The screening included 217 troops representing the 659th
Maintenance Company from Fort Bragg, North Carolina
(arrived on 7 May) and F Troop 3-227 from Fort Hood, Texas
(arrived on 30 April). The outbreak screening criteria were a
modified version of the WHO/US Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention (CDC) ILI case definition [fever (T > 100.5˚F/
38˚C) in addition to cough and/or sore throat in the previous 72
hours]. History/unknown history of fever was added to these
screening criteria due to the known high prevalence of self
treatment with anti-pyretics within mobilizing military units.
A nasopharyngeal (NP) swab was collected, body
temperature was recorded, and the soldiers self-reported their
symptoms via a standardized questionnaire. Specimens were
collected from all soldiers, regardless of reported symptoms.
Soldiers who met the screening criteria were sent to the Camp
Buehring TMC for further evaluation and possible quarantine.
All of the associated NP swabs were transferred to NAMRU-3
for advanced testing. Laboratory results from NAMRU-3 for
both the initial batch and the screening samples were linked
using unique identifiers. Data were double-entered into a
Microsoft Access database and analyzed using Microsoft Excel
and SPSS 19.0 statistical software (SPSS Inc., Chicago, IL,
USA).
Reported Data was collected as part of an outbreak
investigation, supporting International Health Regulation (IHR)
required reporting of a Public Health Event of International
Concern (PHEIC). At the time of data collection, U.S. Naval
Medical Research Unit No. 3 (NAMRU-3) Institutional Review
Board classified all outbreak investigations as activities that do
not involve human research and therefore do not require
participant consent. The outbreak investigation was conducted
on a U.S military base in Kuwait under the authority of the base
commanding officer; consultation with the local authorities was
not required. Participants voluntarily agreed to provide a naso-
pharyngeal swab and to complete an outbreak investigation
questionnaire. While personally identifying information was
initially collected in conjunction with the screening process in
order to facilitate the isolation of soldiers with suspected
infection, the database containing this information was de-
identified prior to analysis. The NAMRU-3 Institutional Review
Board approves the publication of the results of this outbreak
investigation.
RNA extraction
RNA was extracted from NP swabs in viral transport medium
or nasal washes (140µL) using the QIAamp viral RNA mini
extraction kit as recommended by the manufacturer (Qiagen,
Valencia, CA, USA).
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Real-time reverse-transcription polymerase chain
reaction (rt-RT-PCR)
In Kuwait, cDNA production and specific amplification of
each target gene was conducted in one tube, using the
Superscript III RT/Platinum Taq mix (Invitrogen, Carlsbad, CA,
USA) and all reactions were executed using a LightCycler 2.0
(Roche). Influenza testing was performed using the three-target
detection system (universal influenza A via the matrix gene,
seasonal H1 and seasonal H3) developed by CDC, Atlanta [8].
The human RNase P gene was used as a positive control. For
all rt-RT-PCR assays a negative (no template) control and
positive template control were included for each primer set as
per the established protocols. At NAMRU-3, in addition to
confirmation of the Kuwait rt-RT-PCR results, RNA samples
were assayed for the presence of A(H1N1) pdm09 (using the
SwInfA primer and probe set) and specific A(H1N1) pdm09
influenza A viruses using SwH1 primer and probe set
developed by CDC, Atlanta (WHO Collaborating Center for
Influenza at CDC-Atlanta 2009; CDC protocol of rt-RT-PCR for
A(H1N1) pdm09, Atlanta, GA, USA). Assays were performed
using an ABI 7500 DX Fast (Applied Biosystems).
DNA sequence analysis
Sequence analysis was performed on PCR products
obtained after reverse transcription and amplification of RNA
extracted from viral cultures. Complete nucleotide coding
sequences of the hemagglutinin (HA) gene were determined by
cycle sequencing [9]. The Kuwait nucleotide sequences were
aligned with 1047 A(H1N1) pdm09 HA genes (USA, 558; rest
of the Americas, 190; Oceania, 5; Europe, 191; Asia, 103) from
samples collected between 1 April and 31 May 2009 and
obtained from GenBank. Phylogenetic analyses were carried
out using the programs Clustal W/X (Version 2.1), DNASTAR
Lasergene MegAlign (Version 7.1.0, DNASTAR Software for
Life Sciences, Madison, WI, USA) and MEGA 5.05 [10,11]. A
maximum likelihood (ML) dendrogram using the Kimura-2
parameter model with 1000 bootstrap replicates was
constructed and the nearest neighbor interchange for the ML
heuristic method was used for tree inference. The genbank
accession numbers for the Kuwait HA gene sequences
reported in this paper are CY062373, CY062374, CY062375
and CY062376.
Viral culture
Influenza viruses were isolated from clinical samples by
infecting Madin Darby Canine Kidney (MDCK) (ATCC CCL-34)
cells following standard cell culture and virus isolation [12,13].
The specimens were treated with 5 mg/ml gentamicin (GIBCO,
Carlsbad, CA, USA), 1000 U/ml penicillin (GIBCO), 1000µg/ml
streptomycin (GIBCO) and 25 µg/ml amphotericin B (GIBCO)
prior to inoculation. An MDCK cell tube was inoculated with
100µl of the treated samples, incubated at 37°C in a 5% CO2
atmosphere and monitored daily for the appearance of
cytopathic effects (CPE) for 10 days. All cultures were
screened by hemagglutination to detect viral presence. If no
CPE or hemagglutination at day 10 was observed, a second
passage of the specimens was performed. Viral identification
was carried out by rt-RT-PCR and sequence analysis. The
obtained isolates were stored at -70°C for further analyses.
Results
Of the initial 24 specimens transported to NAMRU-3 for
confirmatory testing, 18 (75%) were PCR positive for A(H1N1)
pdm09. Of the 217 NP specimens collected during the active
screening on 19 May, 44 (20%) were positive for A(H1N1)
pdm09 and 173 (80%) were influenza A negative. At the time of
the screening, the soldiers had been in Kuwait for an average
length of 14 days (Range: 6–19 days), and their symptoms
were as follows: 15 (7%) of the soldiers self-reported a history
of fever within 72 hours, 77 (35%) self-reported a cough, 43
(20%) self-reported a sore throat and current fever was
detected in two (<1%) soldiers. The positive predictive value
(PPV), negative predictive value (NPV), sensitivity and
specificity of the modified screening criteria used at the 19 May
screening in Camp Buehring (including the addition of history/
unknown history of fever) were calculated and compared with
the more specific standard WHO ILI screening criteria, as well
as a more sensitive sole criterion of cough within 72 hours.
Table 1 provides the details of these comparisons, and a
supplementary raw data file contains the associated data.
Complete HA nucleotide sequence was obtained for four
cultured isolates obtained from the 18 A(H1N1) pdm09 PCR-
positive clinical samples received by NAMRU-3. The Kuwait
HA genes were 100% identical to each other in their nucleotide
sequence (henceforth referred to as the Kuwait HA gene). The
Kuwait HA gene was compared with 558 HA sequences of
A(H1N1) pdm09 viruses circulating in the U.S. between 1 April
and 31 May 2009 (data not shown). Despite the high degree of
genetic homology within the U.S. group (99.8% average
intrinsic homology), the Kuwaiti samples segregated in a
separate clade that was statistically supported (73% bootstrap
value). The Kuwait HA gene contained two mutations at
nucleotide positions 687 and 1029 that were not translated into
amino acid changes (silent mutations) and were not present in
the U.S. viruses. The translated Kuwait HA protein showed
100% amino acid identity with the HA proteins of some of the
viruses present throughout the U.S. (Arizona, Illinois, Iowa,
New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Texas, Washington and Wisconsin) indicating that influenza
viruses carrying an HA protein identical to the Kuwait samples
were already circulating in this country during this time period.
When the Kuwait HA gene sequence was compared to
nucleotide sequences from A(H1N1) pdm09 viruses collected
Table 1. A comparison of screening criteria based on
results of the 19 May, 2009 active screening, Camp
Buehring.
Screening Criteria PPV NPV Sensitivity Specificity 
Cough alone 42 91 73 74
Fever/hx of fever/UNK hx of fever + (cough or
sore throat)
32 81 16 91
Current fever + (cough or sore throat) 100 80 5 100
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worldwide during the same time period, it was shown that only
one sample from Mexico City shared the same silent nucleotide
change at position 1029 forming a branch close to the Kuwait
HA gene group (Figure 1).
This phylogenetic tree of A(H1N1) pdm09 nucleotide
sequences is representative of viruses circulating in the U.S.
between 01 April and 31 May, 2009, the A/Mexico City/
026/2009 virus and the Kuwait viruses isolated during the
Camp Buhering outbreak. The analysis was carried out using
the Maximum Likelihood method of the MEGA 5.05 software
with 1,000 replicates. Only bootstrap values higher than 60%
are shown. The strain names are indicated in the tree. The
GenBank accession numbers for the Kuwait isolates are
CY062373 to CY062376. The remaining sequences were
obtained from GenBank.
When the Kuwait HA translated protein was compared with
the amino acid sequences from A(H1N1) pdm09 from other
regions of the world, it showed 100% amino acid identity with
viruses from Europe (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Malta,
Norway and the United Kingdom), Asia (China and Japan),
Oceania (New Zealand) and North, Central and South America
(Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Mexico
and Panama). This result indicates that subpopulations of
influenza viruses carrying an HA amino acid sequence identical
to the Kuwait protein were co-circulating globally at the time of
the Kuwait outbreak.
Discussion
The outbreak investigation at Camp Buehring led to the first
reported cases of A(H1N1) pdm09 in Kuwait, and the
laboratory results from the 19 May screening confirmed high
rates of current infection with A(H1N1) pdm09 and ILI in at
least two recently arrived U.S. military units. The introduction of
the virus into Kuwait raised significant geopolitical concerns
early in the pandemic when the severity of A(H1N1) pdm09
was still unclear.
Since deployed military troops represent a population who
may be especially susceptible to and capable of viral
transmission, operational military preventive medicine has
traditionally focused on preventing soldiers from acquiring
infections abroad and transporting agents to the U.S. In
addition to internal public health risk management, however,
the DOD has the added medical and political responsibility of
minimizing the introduction of influenza into international areas
of deployment. During the outbreak in Kuwait, there was
significant potential for spread of the A(H1N1) pdm091strain
from U.S. Army installations to various parts of the world via
deployments and regional troop movement. For example, there
are many Kuwaiti national contractors who work on the military
camps in Kuwait, but live off-base, and many U.S. service
members who were training in Kuwait, were deployed to
Afghanistan and Iraq where A(H1N1) pdm09 virus was later
noted among U.S. service members in large numbers [14].
Active screening for ILI in operational military settings during
a pandemic is also critical because the physical strain and
fatigue of general flu symptoms may impact a soldier’s ability to
maintain situational awareness and top performance in the
field. Deployed service members operate in harsh and dynamic
environments where they are constantly contending with
stressors associated with an impending deployment, lengthy
workdays, rigorous training schedules, severe physical
demands and extreme temperatures. Lastly, when soldiers are
not actively training, they are billeted en masse in tents and
trailers where viral transmission is unavoidable. Even an
outbreak of mild influenza has the potential to render both
individual soldiers and whole units unfit for deployment.
The A(H1N1) pdm09 pandemic prompted questions
regarding the best methods and timing for screening of U.S.
military personnel in order to reduce the risk of influenza
transmission in-theater. For general, passive influenza
surveillance, when establishing screening and isolation criteria
in a U.S. military environment where troops have easy access
to and often overuse non-steroidal medications, military
medical leadership might consider expanding the standard ILI
screening criteria to include a history of fever. Additionally, due
to deployed soldiers’ generally strong sense of camaraderie
and commitment to operational goals and timelines, leadership
might also take into account that the use of self-reported
symptoms may be ineffective. When faced with an influenza
epidemic or pandemic in a military environment, however,
flexibility is crucial to allow rapid transition from a passive to an
active surveillance system. At the onset, when the severity of
the strain is yet unknown and there is concern over introducing
the strain into a new environment, the employment of more
sensitive criteria for screening and potential isolation is crucial.
There are three major time points at which to consider the
establishment of active screening of soldiers: (1) immediately
before deployment from the U.S., (2) upon arrival at the interim
training base, and (3) at the time of forward deployment to their
ultimate duty station. At each of these time points, not only are
these transient military personnel in a position to potentially
introduce a virus into a new environment, but they are also
amassed and readily accessible, i.e., logistically, it is an ideal
opportunity to collect specimens and clinical data.
During the active screening at Camp Buehring, even the
more sensitive, modified WHO ILI screening criteria failed to
capture 84.0% of PCR-positive individuals (i.e., these soldiers
were not recommended for isolation). Additionally, the 91.3% of
influenza A negative soldiers who met the screening criteria
may not have needed to be separated from their platoons.
While both the standard WHO ILI and the modified WHO ILI
screening criteria proved highly specific (100% and 91.3%,
respectively), both screening criteria had extremely low
sensitivities (4.5% and 15.9%, respectively), a key factor at this
early stage in the pandemic. In an operational military setting in
the face of an influenza pandemic of unknown severity, cough
within 72 hours may be a simple, easily observed and effective
screening criterion; using cough as the sole criterion during the
Kuwait screening of recently arrived recruits would have
increased the sensitivity to 72.7%. It is important to keep in
mind, however, that the low specificity of cough alone,
especially in a dusty desert environment, makes this sole
screening criterion inappropriate for prospective passive
screening.
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Figure 1.   A phylogenetic tree of A(H1N1) pdm09 nucleotide sequences.   
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0068639.g001
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At the onset of an influenza pandemic such as that of 2009, it
is arguably appropriate to prioritize sensitivity over specificity
until the severity of the virus can be evaluated. Military medical
commands, however, should have systems in place to
reevaluate and modify screening and isolation criteria as
applicable when the severity of the strain becomes more
apparent. As further information becomes available regarding
the true attack rates and mortality associated with the novel
pandemic virus, screening and isolation criteria should be re-
evaluated and possibly revised to avoid the unnecessary
isolation of uninfected soldiers, as appropriate.
The importance of the availability of reliable, local, real-time
diagnostics is another key lesson learned from this
investigation. Influenza samples from overseas DOD collection
sites are generally shipped to the U.S., requiring maintenance
of a cold chain for up to several weeks before arrival and
testing. At the time of the initial outbreak in Kuwait, extensive
confirmatory lab testing was underway to determine the scope
of the pandemic within the U.S., and the existing system was
not equipped to prioritize samples from regions that were
initially considered to be free from pandemic influenza
transmission. Additionally, at the onset of the A(H1N1) pdm09
pandemic, there was an over-reliance on the QuikVue test,
which is known to be relatively insensitive, for on-site testing of
nasal washes [7]. Diagnostic obstacles in the midst of a
pandemic can significantly delay the reporting of pivotal
screening results from deployed U.S. military personnel. The
incorporation of a regional DOD laboratory, such as NAMRU-3,
for confirmatory testing and outbreak assistance could enhance
the quality and timely reporting time of laboratory data.
Since in-theater laboratories are accredited by the College of
American Pathologists and approved for real-time PCR
performance by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA),
DOD could quickly introduce FDA-approved real-time PCR
protocols, i.e., CDC seasonal influenza PCR protocols, to
identify influenza A and detect the emergence of a novel strain.
Within a few hours, results could be reported to the clinic
collecting the samples where ILI cases could be entered into a
local or online database, thus allowing cases to be tracked in
real time and potentially expedite the identification of emerging
epidemics.
A diagnostic alternative for combat-zone hospital laboratories
where Applied Biosystems real-time PCR instruments are not
available could be a rugged, portable real-time PCR platform,
such as the Joint Biological Agent Identification and Diagnostic
System (JBAIDS). Based on the demonstrated utility of JBAIDS
during the Camp Buehring outbreak investigation as compared
in parallel testing with the Lightcycler 2.0 platform (data not
shown), NAMRU-3 recommends that CDC pursue validation of
its seasonal diagnostic influenza assays and other outbreak-
prone strains, e.g., avian influenza (H5N1) on this platform.
Exceptionally intensified epidemiologic surveillance and
molecular characterization of A(H1N1) pdm09 viruses in the
early stages of the 2009 pandemic allowed for the detection of
genetic diversity among circulating viruses, the establishment
of epidemiologic relationships between cases and outbreaks,
and an enhanced understanding of influenza transmission,
geographical distribution and virus evolution [15-19]. Some of
this observed genetic diversity occurred in response to host
adaptation, but over time, mildly deleterious mutations began to
disappear from the circulating virus population [16]. The
analyses of the Camp Buehring HA sequences with those from
viruses from the Middle East, US, and Mexico obtained later in
the pandemic showed that the synonymous Kuwaiti mutations
at positions 697 and 1029 disappeared from circulating viral
populations.
The main source of variation resulting in synonymous
mutations is the viral replication frequency. Replication
frequency depends on viral replication strategy and is highest
for viruses that cause acute infections and are transmitted via
aerosols. These conditions are achieved during epidemiologic
situations where high rates of infection in crowded human
populations are observed, such as those observed in military
recruits in the U.S. and on the U.S. bases in Kuwait during the
A(H1N1) pdm09 pandemic [20].
The HA gene from the Kuwait A(H1N1) pdm09 viruses
contained two unique but synonymous mutations at the time of
the outbreak at Camp Buerhing. One (nucleotide position 1029)
was already circulating in Mexico. North America was the only
identified geographical region in which this nucleotide change
was present. Because this pandemic virus may cryptically
circulate in an area for two to six weeks prior to detection, it is
likely that the Kuwaiti A(H1N1) pdm09 virus was circulating
among soldiers during their training in the U.S., but went
undetected [17]. The molecular results support the findings of
the epidemiologic investigation; however, the lack of U.S.
sequences identical to the Kuwaiti samples precludes the
pinpointing of the exact geographical area of virus origin within
the U.S.
The results of this outbreak investigation demonstrate the
importance of establishing sound, standardized passive
influenza surveillance systems in operational military
environments that can be readily converted into active
surveillance in the event of a threat. While the current DOD
system employs a standard ILI case definition and provides
recommendations regarding minimum weekly sample
collection, because there is no standardized method of
collection, case clusters may go unrecognized. Additionally, the
weekly summary of aggregate influenza cases captured via the
DOD system does not incorporate data from overseas clinics
like those in Kuwait.
The events of this pandemic also emphasize the importance
of establishing a standardized process for the reporting of
influenza events among U.S. troops in international areas of
deployment. The Camp Buehring A(H1N1) pdm09 outbreak
brought the potential for significant medical and political
implications affecting U.S. military leadership, the government
of Kuwait, and other U.S. Government and global agencies,
e.g., CDC and WHO. Standardized reporting process should
take into consideration the sensitivities and health policies of
the host nation as well as international health regulations. In
order to expedite the distribution of this potentially critical data
to host nations, the U.S. military service branches should work
with WHO to streamline processes regarding the reporting of
infectious diseases among deployed troops.
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Two significant limitations of the outbreak investigation at
Camp Buehring were the inconsistency in sample collection
and testing methods (nasal washes vs. NP swabs and
QuickVue vs. PCR) and the limited population that were
actively screened. Influenza risk management among deployed
soldiers may be enhanced by standardizing screening, data/
sample collection, and sample processing procedures.
Additional suggestions for improved influenza risk management
measures include standardizing treatment and isolation
processes, promoting hand-washing, ensuring the availability
of local real-time diagnostics, and incorporating data from
international areas of deployment into DOD data reporting
systems.
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